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Abstract
We examine how institutional ownership structure gives rise to limits to arbitrage through
its impact on short-sale constraints. Stocks with lower, more concentrated, short-term, and less
passive ownership exhibit lower lending supply, higher costs of shorting, and higher arbitrage
risk. These constraints limit the ability of arbitrageurs to take short positions and delay the cor-
rection of mispricing. Stocks with more concentrated ownership exhibit smaller announcement
day reactions, larger post-earnings announcement drift, and an additional negative abnormal
return of -0.47% in the week following a positive shorting demand shock. (G10, G12, G14)
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Introduction
Arbitrageurs often use short selling as part of their trading strategy, borrowing securities they do
not own to correct overvaluation. Short-sale constraints, such as the inability to locate shares to
borrow, loan fees, and the risk that a lender recalls borrowed shares, increase limits to arbitrage
by reducing investors’ ability to sell stocks they do not own. Miller (1977) and Hong and Stein
(2003) show that stock prices are higher in the presence of short-sale constraints because prices
do not reflect bearish opinions; Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) argue that short-sale restrictions
affect the speed of adjustment to new information; and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show that
limits to arbitrage, such as short-selling costs, hinder arbitrage activity and lead to mispricing and
anomalies. However, much less is known about the sources of these constraints. In this paper,
we examine how ownership composition affects short-sale constraints and gives rise to limits to
arbitrage through its impact on the equity lending market.
Ownership typically comprises a diverse set of investors who have heterogeneous preferences
about security lending based on their own investment philosophy. While institutional investors of-
ten lend shares for a fee to generate income, the decision on whether to lend is not inconsequential
for them. In particular, investors might be concerned that lending their stock may lead to a decline
in stock price and thus the value of their stake. Such a decline in the stock price can have real
effects. Bakke and Whited (2010), Chen et al. (2010), and Edmans et al. (2012) find that stock
prices feed back into management decisions about investment and takeovers, and Goldstein and
Guembel (2008) show that a speculator may manipulate prices by short selling with the objective
of distorting investment. Where short sellers reduce the price, the decline may influence firms’
investment decisions and make creditors or counterparties lose confidence in the firm. This initial
decline in stock price, even if speculative or uninformed, may become self-fulfilling, and, as a
result, can affect prices permanently.1
1There is anecdotal evidence that institutions make lending decisions in active fund portfolios based on potential
price and real effects, even when they actively lend stock from their passive fund portfolios. Fidelity is active in lending
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Another drawback of equity lending is that lending stock to a third party might limit the lender’s
ability to govern management through the proxy voting process (otherwise known as “voice”). Ag-
garwal et al. (2015) show that owners restrict lending supply to exercise voting rights. Furthermore,
investment philosophy, time horizon, fiduciary responsibility, and the ability or incentives to mon-
itor management should affect the decision to provide governance rather than to lend (Maug 1998;
Kahn and Winton 1998; Edmans 2009).2 Investors may trade off the income from lending with
the potential risks of losing monitoring control through transferring shares to the equity lending
market.3 Thus, investors with larger stakes may prefer to withhold their shares from the equity
lending market due to their greater ability to influence prices and/or management, in the hope that
the value of their holdings is lowered by short selling.
The decision to lend stock is also likely influenced by investment philosophy. Evans et al.
(2014) find that passive institutional investors, such as index funds, are more likely to lend se-
curities. Lending fees increase fund returns, but index fund managers face no adverse impact in
performance from providing lending supply, because of the lack of managerial discretion over the
fund’s asset allocation. However, active managers should prefer to retain stocks that matter to their
trading strategy because making them available for lending might lead to lower stock prices and
fund value. Similarly, the investment horizon might affect equity lending. Prior work shows that
investors’ investment horizon influences corporate investment, proxy fights, going-private transac-
tions, and self-tender offers (Gaspar et al. 2005; Chen et al. 2007). Those with a shorter horizon
securities both from their index funds and clients’ holdings through their brokerage, Fidelity Prime Services. However,
in describing Fidelity’s lending practice for their actively managed funds, Chief Investment Officer Dominic Rossi told
a U.K. government select committee in 2013, “The idea that we would lend the stock that we obviously like, otherwise
we would not own it, to someone who is then going to short it does not really make much sense. It is not in the interests
of our clients to have to foster that short selling, nor is it in the interests of the company in which we invest.”(“Fidelity
eyes stock loans exit”, www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/487527f2-9de7-11e2-9ccc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3UgTHruB9, ac-
cessed March 17, 2015.)
2The threat of share lending might provide governance in a manner similar to exit, whereby an investor threatens to
sell stock (and provide downward price pressure) if the manager underperforms (see, Admati and Pfleiderer 2009; Ed-
mans 2009; Edmans and Manso 2011). However, unlike selling stock, lending stock allows the investor to participate
in the upside should the manager improve performance.
3This trade-off has been recognized by BlackRock, which offers investors both regular funds, in which stock can
be lent, and nonlendable funds, in which stock cannot be lent.
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are more likely to trade on short-term signals and consequently should prefer not to lend while
holding a long position.
In summary, we hypothesize that investors, such as blockholders, active investors, or those with
short-term horizons, might withhold stock from the equity lending market because of concerns that
short selling may lead to a decline in price, have negative feedback effects on corporate policies,
and may lead to an increase in the risk of losing monitoring control. Consequently, stocks with
ownership tilted towards larger holdings, investors with short-term horizons, or active investors
should exhibit lower lending supply and greater short-sale constraints.
To understand the impact of ownership composition on short selling, we examine the type
of institutional investor and the degree to which the investor’s actions might influence the stock
price. For each of the 4,487 U.S. stocks in our sample, we compute total institutional ownership,
ownership concentration, the proportion of short-term investors, and portfolio concentration using
institutional investment management ownership data from the Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum
S34 database from SEC’s 13F filings. We identify passive ownership by matching SEC N-SAR
filings on fund operations to the Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum S12 database of mutual fund
holdings. To examine how these ownership composition measures affect lending supply and limits
to arbitrage, we use a proprietary dataset on equity lending.
We start by examining how ownership concentration affects short-sale constraints. Consistent
with the hypothesis that investors with larger holdings prefer not to lend stock, we find that stocks
with more concentrated institutional ownership are associated with lower lending supply, greater
borrowing costs, and greater arbitrage risk.4 Next, we examine how the preference to lend stock
varies with the investment horizon of the five largest institutional holdings in a stock. We find that
stocks with larger holdings by short-term investors also exhibit higher limits to arbitrage. Finally,
we find that stocks with lower levels of passive ownership or higher levels of active ownership,
4We use the term “lending supply” to refer to the “potential supply” since most of these shares are not actually lent
and hence not actually supplied.
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identified as investors who allocate relatively larger portfolio weightings to the stock, exhibit lower
supply, higher loan fees, and higher limits to arbitrage in the cross-section of stocks.
One concern in interpreting our analysis is that stocks with different ownership composition
might differ along some unobserved dimensions endogenously related to limits to arbitrage. To
ensure our results are not driven by such a bias, we employ propensity score-matched sample
analysis, and find similar results. A second concern is reverse causality. To mitigate this concern
we examine SEC 13D filings and show that the announcement of higher ownership by activist
shareholders with large holdings leads to a lower supply and higher limits to arbitrage. Finally,
evidence from dual-class listings provide further support for our results. While dual-class shares
have identical cash-flow rights, the class with the greater voting rights typically has more concen-
trated ownership (e.g., Facebook). We exploit this difference to show that greater concentration
of ownership is associated with lower lending supply and greater short-sale constraints within the
same firm at the same time.
To investigate the consequences of the short-sale constraints we document on stock prices,
we examine whether stock returns following an increase in shorting demand vary with owner-
ship structure. Short-sale constraints related to ownership characteristics may limit the ability of
arbitrageurs to take short positions, and this, in turn, would lead to larger delays in incorporat-
ing pessimistic investors’ opinions. We show that abnormal returns following shocks to shorting
demand are restricted to firms with high ownership concentration. Stocks in the top quartile of
ownership concentration have average abnormal returns after an outward loan demand shock equal
to -0.47% per week, relative to stocks with a dispersed ownership facing a similar shock. This
effect is unrelated to the level of total institutional ownership. Our findings are robust to firm and
calendar fixed effects, are robust to differences in investor sentiment, are robust to the inclusion
of liquidity variables, and hold for abnormal returns based on the four-factor model using calen-
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dar portfolio regressions. Overall, the constraints we describe are associated with slower price
adjustment, which can help to explain the predictability found by previous researchers.5
The short-sale constraints we describe also affect the speed at which prices adjust to new in-
formation revealed in earnings announcements. Stocks with more concentrated ownership exhibit
smaller announcement-day reactions and larger post-earnings announcement drift. This result is
mostly concentrated in negative news events, consistent with the relation between informed short
selling and future returns found by Boehmer et al. (2008) and Engelberg et al. (2012). Combined
with the findings for returns, these results provide evidence that ownership concentration affects
the speed of information flows by constraining short selling.
Our paper contributes to the literature that examines how short selling affects stock prices.
While most papers study the affect of a change in demand for borrowing stock (e.g., short interest)
on stock prices, only a few use the price to borrow shares (e.g., Asquith et al. 2005; Lamont
2012; Nagel 2005; Akbas et al. 2008; Kolasinski et al. 2013). However, examining demand and
fee as proxies for short-sale constraints suffers from the usual identification challenge that short-
sale constraints might be due to unobserved lending supply. Cohen et al. (2007) address this
challenge by indirectly identifying shifts in demand and supply from observed changes in prices
and quantities. They show that shifts in supply alone do not explain returns, but cannot identify
how supply-side constraints on short selling affect returns. A couple of papers examine the impact
of the supply channel on fees. Kolasinski et al. (2013) study the loan supply schedule and find
that the presence of search frictions results in higher fees. Kaplan et al. (2013) examine a lender-
specific shock to the supply of lendable shares and find that lending supply impacts short-sale
constraints, such as fees. We provide direct evidence on the effects of lending supply on short-
sale constraints and returns and show that, via the equity lending market, institutional ownership
structure is one source of these limits to arbitrage.
5Autore et al. (2015) and Blocher et al. (2013) show that hard-to-borrow stocks can become highly overvalued and
Stambaugh et al. (2012) and Avramov et al. (2013) find that profits from anomaly-based strategies reside mostly on
the short-side of the trade.
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1 The Market for Borrowing Stock
We use a proprietary dataset of equity lending supply and loans from Markit, which collects this
information from many of the largest custodians and prime brokers in the securities lending in-
dustry.6 The data comprise security-level daily information from August 1, 2006 to December 31,
2010. As of December 2010, of the $5.7 trillion in stocks available to borrow, $387 billion was ac-
tually lent. This corresponds to an utilization level (i.e., amount lent, divided by amount available
to borrow) of around 15%. Equity loans are not a perfect measure of short-selling activity, since
stock loans might be used as part of tax-arbitrage strategies (see, for example, Christoffersen et al.
2005), however the vast majority of stock loans are undertaken with the purpose of shorting.
Equity supply postings contain the dollar value of shares available for borrowing on a given
day. We define lending supply as the dollar value of lendable shares relative to a firm’s market
capitalization. Similarly, loan quantity is the dollar value of shares on loan on a given day rela-
tive to market capitalization. Loan fees are set in two different ways, depending on the type of
collateral placed by the borrower. If borrowers use cash—the dominant form of collateral in the
United States—then the loan fee is defined as the difference between the risk-free interest rate and
the rebate rate. The rebate rate is the portion of the interest rate on the collateral the borrower
receives. If, instead, the transaction uses other securities as collateral, like U.S. Treasuries, the fee
is directly negotiated between the borrower and the lender. The contract-type variable examines
whether equity loan transactions are open or fixed term. Open-term loans are renegotiated every
day, and fixed-term loans have predefined clauses and maturities. The overnight risk-free rate of
the collateral’s currency is used for open-term loans. Because ownership data are reported quar-
terly, we compute quarterly averages of daily equity lending variables for each firm. Variables are
winsorized at the 1% level to reduce the impact of outliers.
6The information is collected daily from 125 custodians and 32 prime brokers. Markit estimates that the data
represent 85% of global equity lending and 90% of the U.S. lending market. See Saffi and Sigurdsson (2011) for a
detailed description.
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In Figure 1, we show lending supply and shares on loan as a fraction of market capitalization
(left) and the average loan fee (right). The average loan fee in December 2010 was around 116
basis points (bps) a year, similar to the figures reported by D’Avolio (2002) and Kolasinski et al.
(2013). Lending supply was around 20%-25% for most of the period, but we can see the noticeable
reduction in shares available to borrow that takes place in the final quarter of 2008 after the financial
crisis.
[Insert Figure 1 HERE]
In Figure 2, we plot the total lending supply and total loaned shares in billions of dollars (right
axis) and the average utilization (left axis) in a given quarter. After 2008, the utilization rate
fell from 24% in September 2008 to 14.6% in December 2010, because of deleveraging after the
financial crisis.
[Insert Figure 2 HERE]
2 Empirical Methodology
2.1 Data
Our explanatory variables describe the structure of institutional ownership. The data come from
the Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum database on SEC 13F filings. Form 13F is filed quarterly
by institutional investors who exercise investment discretion over accounts holding at least $100
million in eligible equity securities. They report the total long positions in each eligible security
aggregated across all accounts over which they exercise investment discretion. The data are avail-
able from August 1, 2006 until December 31, 2010, for approximately 5,000 stocks. For each
stock, we calculate the ownership by each institution and total institutional ownership, both as a
percentage of market capitalization.
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Equity lending characteristics, including lendable supply and borrowing fee, are available at
the stock level and are taken from Markit. We match firms in the equity lending database with those
in CRSP. The final sample has 59,276 firm-quarter observations for 4,487 firms. From CRSP data,
we compute market capitalization, turnover, share price, cumulative quarterly returns, the stan-
dard deviation of daily returns, and cumulative abnormal returns based on the Daniel et al. (1997)
characteristics-matched factor and arbitrage risk. Following Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), we
define arbitrage risk as the standard deviation of the residuals based on the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model of returns, which measures the volatility of the portion of returns that cannot be
hedged by standard risk factors. Throughout, we only use common shares with prices larger than
$1.7
2.2 Ownership composition
Because stock ownership may influence lending supply in a variety of ways, we focus on four
measures of ownership composition: ownership concentration, the investment horizon of investors,
holdings by passive investors, and the weighting in investors’ portfolios.
First, we consider the concentration of institutional ownership, measured as the Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index (normalized to be between 0 and 1) of institutions’ holding of the stock using
13F filings. A more concentrated ownership structure, or a structure including larger single insti-
tutional investors, such as block holders, results in shareholders having a greater influence in the
equity lending market vis-a`-vis a highly dispersed ownership structure.8 The role for ownership
concentration is also motivated by Duffie et al. (2002), who present a dynamic model of asset
valuation in which short selling requires searching for security lenders and bargaining over the
lending fee. Stocks for which ownership, and thus lending capacity, is concentrated within a few
7Our results are also robust to the following additional filters: (1) stocks with prices above $5, (2) including only
firms with more than ten institutional investors, and (3) excluding stocks in the smallest market capitalization decile.
8This measure of concentration clearly captures blockholdings of more than 5%, but it also captures significant
ownership by one or more investors below the blockholding cutoff.
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institutions should exhibit steeper supply curves and higher loan fees because lenders have greater
bargaining power.
Second, we examine the investment horizon of the firm’s institutional investors with significant
holdings following Chen et al. (2007). Using 13F filings we classify long-term investors as those
largest five investors who have held the stock for more than twelve months. Given their investment
horizons, long-term investors are less likely to be affected by short-term price fluctuations and can
earn higher returns by lending their shares.
Third, we focus on passive ownership, following Evans et al. (2014), by using N-SAR filings on
a fund’s operations and investment strategy to identify index funds. Specifically, we use question
69 of the N-SAR form, “Is the Registrant/Series an index fund? (Y/N)”, to identify whether a given
fund is an index fund.9 Because N-SAR filings identify index funds and 13F filings are only re-
ported at the fund management level, we are unable to map N-SAR filings onto 13F holdings where
fund management companies report both active and passive funds in 13F filings (e.g., Blackrock).
Instead, we match index funds with holdings using the Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum S12 file
on individual mutual fund holdings and aggregate holdings of matched index funds to measure the
fraction of passive ownership for each specific stock.
Fourth, we study the relationship between equity lending and the exposure of institutional
portfolios to individual stocks. If investors are less likely to lend stocks in which they hold large
positions, either because they actively trade these stocks or because shorting price pressure may
reduce portfolio value, then we should observe a lower lending supply. We measure portfolio
concentration for each stock by examining each institution’s holding in a stock relative to the mean
stock holding in their portfolio. For each institution-stock pair, we use holdings data from the
Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum S34 database to measure the difference between the portfolio
9The N-SAR data are reported at the fund series level. Typically, a series is a single fund. However, where it
includes more than one fund, the filing is common for all funds in the series. Results are robust to using the index flag
in CRSP directly or a text search for the word “index” in the fund name.
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weight for the stock and the mean portfolio weight for that institution and then take the dollar-
value-weighted sum of this difference across all institutions for a particular stock.10
The decision to lend shares is typically made at the institution or management company level,
with either an internal lending desk or a custodian pooling holdings. Therefore, we study the trade-
off facing the investor when deciding to lend shares at the management company level. However,
the decision may lie with the fund manager.11 To mitigate this concern, we also constrain the
ownership to mutual funds only and estimate the concentration measures at the fund level using the
Thomson mutual fund holdings database. The ownership and portfolio measures have correlations
of 0.69 and 0.41, respectively, compared with the management-level variables, and the main results
of our paper are unchanged (see Internet Appendix Table 3).
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for our main variables. The average firm has 20% of its mar-
ket capitalization available to lend (Supply), and 4.7% of its capitalization is on loan (On loan),
with the shares costing 70.6 bps per year to be borrowed (Fee). In our sample, 13.9% of firm-
quarter observations are Special, that is, they have lending fees above 100 bps. Average total
institutional ownership (Total) is 58.3%, and average ownership concentration (HHI) is 12.11%,
with 141 institutions being shareholders of the average firm (Breadth).12 The largest five institu-
tional investors (Top 5) own 54.6% of total institutional ownership, with approximately two-thirds
of this being held by investors with a long-term horizon (Top 5–LT). Our portfolio concentration
measure (Port. conc.) has a mean of 0.34% on a value-weighted basis.13 The average stock’s index
10We set the difference between the stock portfolio weight and mean portfolio weight to zero for institutions com-
prised solely of index funds because there is no discretion over portfolio weights.
11In conversations wth Markit, the data provider, they confirmed that the decision to lend shares is made at the
management company level, but individual fund managers might be able to opt out.
12For illustration purposes, the median HHI of 6.56% can be described by the median of 90 investors, where the
Top 5 investors combined hold approximately half of the total institutional holdings, and the remaining 85 investors
each hold 0.33% of total holdings.
13The mean portfolio concentration is zero at the institution-stock level, where we measure the difference between
the portfolio weight for the stock and the mean portfolio weight for the institution. At the stock level, the mean
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ownership (%Index) is 5.4%. Throughout our tests, we also include the change in the number of
institutional investors (∆(Breadth)) as a control variable for investor sentiment (see Chen et al.
(2002)).
[Insert Table 1 HERE]
Given our focus on lending supply, in Table 2 we report the sample’s main characteristics sorted
by lending supply quintiles. In panel A, we find that the difference in lending supply moving from
the lowest and highest quintiles corresponds to about 36% of market capitalization. The number of
shares loaned out (as a percentage of total shares outstanding) increases with lending supply. As
expected, loan fees are decreasing in supply. Firms with low supply are about seven times more
expensive to borrow (187 bps per year) than those in the highest lending supply quintile (26 bps
per year). These resemble those reported by D’Avolio (2002), though shares in our database are
slightly more expensive and are lent much more often. Both reflect the growth in the equity lending
market in recent years and the fact that our data cover a much larger number of data providers.
In examining institutional ownership variables in panel B, we find that total ownership grows
with lending supply, consistent with its use as a proxy for lending supply as in Nagel (2005).
Ownership concentration (HHI), the fraction of total ownership held by the largest 5 holdings (Top
5), and the fraction held by long-term investors (Top 5–LT) decrease with lending supply. Broadly
speaking, %Index, Port. conc., and Breadth increase with Supply through low to middle quintiles.
In panel C, we find that firms with higher supply tend to be larger and have higher stock turnover,
but lower arbitrage risk.
[Insert Table 2 HERE]
portfolio concentration is positive, which is likely because portfolio weights tend to be greater when there are fewer
institutions invested in the stock.
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3 Empirical Results
3.1 How does institutional ownership composition affect equity lending sup-
ply?
We apply multivariate regression analysis to study the impact of ownership structure on lend-
ing supply by using pooled OLS regressions with quarterly data. All models include stock fixed
effects (to absorb time-invariant stock-specific effects) and year-quarter dummy variables (to ab-
sorb time-varying effects). Following Petersen (2009), standard errors are double clustered at the
firm and year-quarter levels. In each quarter, we standardize all variables to have zero mean and
unit standard deviation. We apply this transformation to allow for an easier comparison of each
variable’s impact on supply, with estimated coefficients denoting the impact of a one-standard-
deviation change in the explanatory variable. We include change in breadth (∆(Breadth)); firm
market capitalization (Mkt. cap); an indicator variable equal to one if the stock price is below
$5 (DP<5); Amihud’s ILLIQ; stock turnover (Turnover); book-to-market ratio (B/M); a S&P 500
index membership indicator (DS&P500); the natural logarithm of the number of analysts follow-
ing the stock (No. of analysts); and the cumulative return in the previous two quarters as control
variables (Momentum).14
Table 3 presents evidence on lending supply and ownership structure. We first examine how
total institutional ownership influences lending supply in Column (1). The coefficient for total
ownership (Total) on equity lending supply is positive and statistically significant. A one-standard-
deviation increase in total ownership is associated with lending supply being 0.447 standard devia-
tions higher, which is equivalent to a 28.8% (= 0.447∗0.129
0.200
) increase relative to mean lending supply.
In Column (2), we examine institutional ownership concentration. The estimated coefficient for
HHI is negative and statistically significant. A one-standard-deviation increase in ownership con-
14The number of observations falls from 59,276 to 59,055 because of singletons.
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centration is associated with a decrease in the lending supply of 0.043 standard deviations, which
is equivalent to a 3.0% (= −0.043∗0.129
0.200
) decrease relative to the average lending supply. We also
find that smaller firms and firms with low turnover, low book-to-market ratios, and prices below
$5 tend to have smaller lending supply. Overall, our results show that ownership concentration is
significant in explaining the availability of stocks to borrow, consistent with the hypothesis that
investors do not lend stocks when their actions have greater price effects.
[Insert Table 3 HERE]
In Column (3), we examine the investment horizon of institutional investors. We include both
the fraction of ownership concentrated in the largest five holdings (Top 5) and the share of the
largest five holdings held by investors with a long-term investment horizon (Top 5–LT). The results
for Top 5 mirror those of HHI in Column (2). While higher institutional ownership is associated
with higher lending supply, concentrated institutional ownership has the opposite effect. Both
measures of institutional concentration, HHI and Top 5, capture the effects of concentration and
institutional influence. Larger institutional investors are more likely to interact with the firm’s
management, and this fact in itself may determine whether an institutional owner is willing to lend
shares.15 Our results suggest that concentrated and influential ownership structures both reduce
equity lending supply. However, the positive coefficient on Top 5–LT in Column (3) suggests that
large holders that are short term in nature are less likely to lend stock. This could be due to two
effects. First, these investors have short-term horizons and thus would be more affected by a price
decrease following short selling. Second, changes in the investment horizon of large holders might
be due to activist shareholders taking a stake in the firm. Such investors hold stock to strategically
intervene or trade, rather than to earn lending fees. We examine this possibility in Section 3.3.4.
In Column (4), we examine how a passive investor base influences lending supply. In line
with Evans et al. (2014), we find that %Index, measured as the fraction of index-fund ownership
15Prior literature has used measures of investor influence to show that firms with more influential institutional
investors have higher CEO pay for performance and lower compensation (Hartzell and Starks (2003)).
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of the specific stock, relates positively to lending supply. Finally, in Column (5), we examine if
institutional investors are concerned about lending out holdings that are a significant part of their
portfolio. Portfolio concentration (Port. conc.) captures how overweight, on average, institutional
investors are in a stock. The negative and significant coefficient found for Port. conc. is consistent
with the lending supply decreasing for stocks for which institutions allocate a larger portfolio
weight.
3.2 How does institutional ownership composition affect short-sale constraints?
An important issue when analyzing the effects of ownership on equity lending is measuring the
extent to which ownership affects short-sale constraints. While ownership effects may be large for
lending supply, they may be irrelevant if they do not affect the cost of borrowing stock, which, in
turn, constrains short selling and affects asset prices. We investigate the relation between institu-
tional ownership structure and short-sale constraints by focusing on loan fee and arbitrage risk.
The fee reflects the cost of borrowing stock and is the most direct form of short-sale constraint.
If the profits from a short-sale trade are smaller than the loan fee, investors face limits to arbitrage,
and anomalies may persist for a longer period. Table 4 presents evidence that loan fees tend
to be higher where institutional ownership is more concentrated or when investors have shorter
investment horizons. Once again, we employ pooled ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions
with stock and time fixed effects and include the same set of control variables used in Table 3. In
the first two Columns, we test for the effects of total ownership (Total) and ownership concentration
(HHI) on borrowing fee. A one-standard-deviation increase in Total is associated with a decrease
in fees of 5.6 bps, and a one-standard-deviation increase in HHI is associated with an increase in
fee of 5.2 bps, both economically significant when compared with the mean lending fee of 71 bps.
In Columns (3)–(5) we examine whether institutions’ investment horizon (Top 5–LT) and phi-
losophy (%Index and Port. conc.) relate to borrowing fees. Short-term investors and investors who
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are overweight in the stock are more likely to withhold lending supply, which should relate to a
higher cost of borrowing stock. This is consistent with the negative coefficient found for Top 5–LT
in Column (3) and the positive coefficient for Port. conc. in Column (5). However, we find no
such result for stocks with a relatively larger passive investor base (%Index) in Column (4). This
may stem from passive funds’ preference for stocks with higher lending fees, and this can provide
extra lending revenues and help increase total returns (Prado (2015); Blocher and Whaley (2015)).
[Insert Table 4 HERE]
In Columns (7) to (12) of Table 4, we investigate the effects of ownership on arbitrage risk,
measured as the mean squared error of daily stock returns’ residuals from the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model regression (as in Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002)). Greater idiosyncratic variability
limits arbitrageurs’ ability to trade on mispricing. For our sample, arbitrage risk has a mean of
2.99% and a standard deviation of 2.65%. In Columns (7) and (8), we find that total ownership is
associated with a decrease in arbitrage risk and that ownership concentration relates positively to
arbitrage risk. The coefficient on HHI (0.049) has an opposite relation to arbitrage risk than total
ownership (-0.110), illustrating that ownership concentration should be accounted for by investors
concerned with arbitrage risk. When we turn to investment horizon, we find similar results to
those found for loan fee. While concentrated ownership is associated with an increase in arbitrage
risk, the effect is amplified when the investors take a short-term investment horizon. For passive
ownership, unlike for loan fee, we find that stocks with greater index ownership exhibit lower
arbitrage risk. Finally, portfolio concentration is positively associated with arbitrage risk.
A valid concern in interpreting the results in Table 4 is that, while ownership structure can
limit arbitrage due to its effect on lending supply, there might be alternative channels through which
ownership affects limits to arbitrage. Lending supply might affect limits to arbitrage independently
of ownership structure, or it may be that ownership structure limits arbitrage through channels
other than lending supply. We address these concerns by computing a forecast of lending supply
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as a linear function of total institutional ownership (Total) and ownership concentration (HHI). In
Columns (6) and (12), we use this forecast instead of the actual observed Supply. We find that
loan fee and arbitrage risk still negatively relate to the component of lending supply explained by
ownership structure.
3.3 Propensity score-matched sample results
Stocks with high ownership concentration and stocks with low ownership concentration may differ
along some other dimensions correlated with lending supply and limits to arbitrage. To ensure our
results are not driven by such a bias, we employ a propensity score-matched sample specification.
For each of the four ownership characteristics–ownership concentration, investor horizon, passive
investing, and portfolio concentration–we identify a treatment and control group that are similar
along each given characteristic.
For ownership concentration, we match on the propensity of a stock having highly concen-
trated ownership, where highly concentrated ownership is classified as being in the top quartile of
concentration. The matching attempts to randomize the treatment of ownership structure across the
high concentration (treatment) stocks and non-high-concentration (control) stocks by ensuring that
the two groups are comparable on observed covariates that might explain ownership concentration.
In the first stage of the match, we compute propensity scores using a probit regression predicting
high ownership concentration with firm characteristics other than ownership concentration (i.e.,
the observed covariates) as controls. In the full sample, the treatment and control groups have very
different probabilities of being in the top quartile of ownership concentration. The propensity score
is 0.091 for the untreated sample in the unmatched sample and 0.729 for the treated sample, with
the difference being significant at the 1% level. When we examine the propensity-matched sample,
we find that both the treatment and control groups are equally likely to be in the top ownership con-
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centration quartile. The matching algorithm results in a propensity equal to 0.407 for the control
group and 0.404 for the treated group, with the difference not being statistically significant.16
Using the propensity-matched sample, we re-estimate the regressions shown in Column (2)
of Table 3 and Columns (2) and (8) of Table 4. Panel A of Table 5 presents the results. For
brevity, we show only the coefficients on Total and HHI and suppress the coefficient on the set
of controls common to Tables 3 and 4. Even when compared with similar stocks, ownership
concentration remains significantly negative related to lending supply and positive related to loan
fees and arbitrage risk.
In panel B of Table 5, we repeat the exercise for Top 5–LT. This time, we match on the propen-
sity of being in the top quartile of Top 5–LT. The propensity score is 0.139 for the untreated sample
in the unmatched sample and 0.583 for the treated sample, with a significant difference at the 1%
level. In the matched sample, the propensity is equal to 0.500 for both the treatment and control
group, with a nonsignificant difference. Consistent with our earlier results, we find that stocks with
investors with a short-term investment horizon have lower supply and higher limits to arbitrage,
measured as the lending fee.
[Insert Table 5 HERE]
In panels C and D, we focus on passive ownership and portfolio concentration. For each
characteristic, we re-match and estimate the effects of ownership on supply, fee, and arbitrage risk.
While we find significance for lending supply, we find little evidence that %Index and Port. conc.
affect short-sale constraints. The results suggest that stocks with low passive ownership or high
portfolio concentration might differ along some unobservable dimension and that this plays a role
in explaining the relation we document.
16We employ a flexible specification for the propensity score (see Imbens (2014)) and include the set of controls
used in Table 3, total ownership, and interactions and higher orders of these variables. The match is completed using
the nearest neighbor without replacement based on the covariates and interactions, with a 0.01 caliper. Of the 14,819
treatment observations, we find matches for 5,280. In total, 10,560(=2*5,280) observations comprise the propensity-
matched sample.
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3.4 Evidence from 13D filings
Concentrated ownership might be associated with active investors taking large positions in a stock.
These investors hold the stock strategically and thus should be less likely to lend because they
may choose to exit or use voice to exert control. We examine how large active investors influence
equity lending supply by examining SEC 13D filings. Schedule 13D, commonly referred to as a
beneficial ownership report, is filed with the SEC when an investor acquires ownership of more
than 5% of a voting class of a company’s equity securities. In particular, a 13D must be filed if the
investor aims to change or influence control, that is, activism.
We identify 326 firms associated with SEC 13D filings in our sample using the SharkRepellant
database. We focus on the first filing in our sample for each firm and identify the event date of
the acquisition of stock. We can match 223 of the 326 filings with firms in our sample. For
this matched sample, we examine ownership composition in the four quarters before and after the
SEC 13D filing. In panel A of Table 6, we present univariate tests of the differences in ownership
around the filing. Unsurprisingly, the fraction of institutional ownership held by block holders (i.e.,
holdings ≥ 5%) increases post-filing as does ownership concentration. The fraction of stock held
by institutional investors and index funds is unchanged. Overall, the 13D filing event is associated
with an increase in activist holdings that increases concentration.
[Insert Table 6 HERE]
Additionally, we provide univariate tests of the differences in lending supply and limits to
arbitrage. In support of our earlier findings, the increase in activist holdings leads to lower lending
supply and higher limits to arbitrage. Finally, we formally examine this relation in a regression
framework. Since the 233 13D filings are staggered through our sample period, we estimate a
difference-in-differences test with stock and time fixed effects, in which the treated stocks are
those with a 13D filing in the quarter and the control group includes all remaining stocks. The
difference-in-differences absorbs the stock-specific ownership characteristics, as well as factors
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common to all stocks each quarter. We present the evidence in panel B of Table 6. The coefficient
on Post, which is a dummy variable equal to one in the four quarters post-filing, is negative for
supply and positive for both fee and arbitrage risk. Hence, the results on 13D filings not only
support our main findings on lending supply and limits to arbitrage, but they also help shed light
on activist behavior. The decision to lend shares appears to be negatively influenced by the intent
of institutional investors to engage in shareholder activism or monitoring.
3.5 Evidence from dual-class listings
Dual-class listings provide further evidence in support of our results. While dual-class shares have
identical cash-flow rights, the class with the greater voting rights typically has more concentrated
ownership. We exploit this to show that ownership concentration matters for lending supply and
short-sale constraints within the same firm at the same time, which mitigates the concern that our
results are driven by variation in bearish sentiment and demand for short selling. For example,
Molson Coors Brewery has class A voting shares and class B nonvoting shares. For class A (B)
shares, the average HHI is 0.77 (0.04), the average Supply is 0.3% (11.3%), and the average loan
fee is 90 bps (10 bps), illustrating our hypothesis that more concentrated ownership constrains
supply and increases limits to arbitrage.
We test this formally by identifying all dual-class stocks in our sample. For each firm identifier
(i.e., CUSIP6), we examine how many share classes (i.e., CUSIP8) are traded in a given year-
quarter. There are fifty-six firms with available data on class A shares with voting rights and class
B shares with no or limited voting rights. For each firm class, we estimate the average HHI, Supply,
Fee, and Arbitrage risk in our sample period and then take the difference between the share classes
within each firm, thereby absorbing any firm-specific and time-specific effects. This results in
fifty-six observations of the class difference, one for each firm with dual-class shares. The class
difference in HHI equals 0.21 and is significant at the 1% level. The class difference in Supply is
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-17.2%, the class difference in Fee is 57 bps, and the class difference in Arbitrage risk is 0.469,
all significant at the 1% level. Thus, even controlling for the underlying cashflows of the stock,
greater ownership concentration seems associated with higher limits to arbitrage.
3.6 Ownership structure, limits to arbitrage, and stock returns
3.6.1 Stock returns and borrowing demand shifts: Portfolio analysis
The results in the previous sections describe the effects of ownership structure on equity lending
supply, loan fees, and arbitrage risk. If ownership concentration results in higher short-sale con-
straints and increases arbitrage risk, arbitrageurs face greater limits to arbitrage. Thus, one should
expect mispricing to build up and subsequent returns to short selling to be more negative as prices
take longer to adjust. In essence, greater limits to arbitrage result in a delay in price correction
because of a lack of timely arbitrage. Another possibility described by Cohen et al. (2007), Engel-
berg et al. (2013), and Drechsler and Drechsler (2014) is that shorting stocks is riskier for investors
speculating on negative price information because of the higher borrowing costs and arbitrage
risks. Hence, short sellers require more negative returns in compensation. Under both explana-
tions, we should observe more negative returns following increases in the demand for short selling
for stocks with more concentrated ownership.
We employ the methodology proposed by Cohen et al. (2007) to test sensitivity of returns,
conditional on an outward demand shift, to ownership structure. The identification strategy consists
of constructing price-quantity pairs from the equity lending market to isolate clear shifts in supply
and demand. For example, an increase in the loan fee (i.e., price), coupled with an increase in
the percentage of shares on loan (i.e., quantity), corresponds to an increase in shorting demand, as
would be the case for any increase in price coupled with an increase in quantity.
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We define DOUT and DIN in the following way:
DOUT i,t−1 =
 1 if Fee scoret−1 – Fee scoret−2 > 0 and On loant−1 – On loant−2 >00 otherwise,
DINi,t−1 =
 1 if Fee scoret−1 – Fee scoret−2 < 0 and On loant−1 –On loant−2 <00 otherwise,
where i stands for stock, t for week, and On loan is the amount of shares on loan. Fee score is a
measure of daily borrowing costs computed by Markit. This variable captures the loan-weighted
fee charged by lenders based on Markit’s proprietary benchmark rate, where 1 indicates the cheap-
est and 10 the most expensive stocks to borrow. It is designed to measure levels of fee that differ
economically from each other. We employ Fee score, rather than Fee, to avoid incorrectly catego-
rizing demand shifts because of changes in the Fed Open Rate or small changes in the rebate rate.
In our sample, more than 80% of the stocks have a score equal to 1, with only 3% having values
greater than or equal to 5.
Each of the shifts has an economic interpretation. DOUT captures the case in which there is
an increase in both the cost of shorting (i.e., loan fee) and the amount that investors are willing to
short at this higher cost. Effectively, more capital is betting that the price will decrease, despite the
higher explicit cost of betting. DIN captures the case in which both shorting costs and the amount
that investors borrow at this lower price decrease. The effect of DIN on returns is likely to be
smaller than the one from DOUT because if investors have positive expectations about the stock
they can purchase it in the spot market. Cohen et al. (2007) show that DOUT is a strong predictor of
negative abnormal returns. Our hypothesis is that this effect on returns is related to a tightening of
short-sale constraints due to ownership characteristics. For example, cross-sectionally, we should
observe that abnormal returns conditional on an outward demand shock are more negative for
high-concentration stocks.
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In Table 7, we examine average returns of portfolios conditional on an outward demand shock
and institutional ownership. We place all stocks into two demand-shift portfolios, DOUT=1 and
DOUT=0, and further sort on quartiles of HHI, %Index, and Port. Conc. Demand shift portfolios
are formed in week t − 1, ownership quartiles are based on the prior quarter (the most recent
data available), and the stocks are held in the portfolios during week t and rebalanced every week.
For ownership characteristics, we sort stocks into quartiles each period and define an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the stock is in the top quartile and 0 otherwise. We present results for
abnormal returns, measured as the difference between the weekly stock return and the return on a
characteristics-matched benchmark portfolio sorted on market capitalization, book-to-market, and
momentum following Daniel et al. (1997).
Panel A examines abnormal returns for ownership concentration. Comparing the abnormal
returns across DOUT = 1 and DOUT = 0 shows that an outward demand shift is associated
with a negative future return, as documented by Cohen et al. (2007). The average difference
is statistically significant at 1% and equal to -0.469% per week (-1.98% per month). However,
when we further sort returns by ownership concentration, we find that the abnormal return for
high concentration stocks (Top HHI=1) that experience an outward demand shift is -0.475% in the
following week (relative to those that experience no outward demand shock), compared with the
abnormal return for low-concentration stocks that experience an outward demand shift of -0.005%
a week (relative to those that experience no outward demand shock). The difference-in-differences
abnormal return (across ownership structure and DOUT ) is -0.470% a week and significant at the
1% level. The results suggest that the impact of outward demand shocks on returns varies with
ownership concentration.
A natural concern in panel A is that, if ownership concentration is correlated with total own-
ership, our documented results may stem from total ownership. We address this concern in panel
B. Rather than sort on HHI, we first regress HHI on Total and then sort stocks on the residuals
of this regression, which reflects the component of ownership concentration orthogonal to total
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ownership. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively similar: the difference-in-differences
abnormal return (across ownership structure and DOUT ) is -0.482% a week and significant at the
1% level.
[Insert Table 7 HERE]
In panels C and D, we examine how returns following an outward demand shift vary with %In-
dex and Port. conc., where once again we apply the component not explained by total ownership.
We find little evidence that passive ownership or investors’ relative portfolio concentration im-
pact returns through tightening short-sale constraints, consistent with the findings in Section 3.3.3,
where we found that %Index and Port. conc. do not affect short-sale constraints once we employ
a propensity-matched sample of stocks.
While these returns in panels A and B look large, they do not take into account any transaction
costs needed to rebalance the portfolio every week. Every week, the trade involves new short
positions and reversing existing short positions. In our sample, 2.61% of stocks are estimated
to have an outward demand shock in the last week (i.e., DOUT = 1) and no observed shock
in the prior week (i.e., lagged DOUT = 0). Similarly, 2.63% of stocks have DOUT = 0 and
lagged DOUT = 1. Thus, the estimated weekly turnover in the portfolio is around 5.24%. If
we follow a conservative approach and take the average total trading costs shown by Keim and
Madhavan (1998) for Nasdaq stocks in the middle quintile of firms ranked by market capitalization,
we estimate weekly trading costs for the DOUT = 1 − DOUT = 0 portfolio to be equal to
2 ∗ 0.524 ∗ 0.92% = 0.1% per week.17 This would reduce the estimated abnormal returns by
almost a quarter, from 0.48% per week to 0.38% per week. Another source of costs are the lending
fees paid to borrow shares required to implement short leg of theDOUT = 1 strategy. The average
lending fee of the DOUT = 1 portfolio is 3.5% a year or 0.07% a week. This would reduce the
weekly return of the DOUT = 1−DOUT = 0 portfolio in Column 1 by 0.07/2 = 0.035%, with
17Keim and Madhavan (1998) use trades by twenty-one institutions between January 1991 and March 1993. Given
the reduction in transaction costs over time, the trading costs during our sample period are likely to be even lower.
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average abnormal returns further decreasing from -0.38% to -0.34% per week. Overall, trading
costs reduce the profitability of the strategy by approximately 30%, but its net performance is still
economically and statistically significant.
3.6.2 Stock returns and borrowing demand shifts: cross-sectional estimations
Next, we determine the effect of ownership concentration on returns following outward demand
shifts in a full multivariate regression setting, controlling for a wide array of variables. We estimate
cross-sectional pooled regressions using weekly abnormal returns, including calendar month dum-
mies, and double-clustered standard errors at the firm and time level. The baseline specification
takes the form:
Ri,t = α+ θt + β1DOUTt−1 + β2Top(OWNi,q−1) + β3Totali,q−1
+β4DOUTt−1 ∗ Top(OWNi,q−1) + β6CTRLSi,t−1 + εi,t, (1)
where Rit is the abnormal return on stock i in week t, DOUTt−1 is a dummy variable equal to
1 if there was an outward demand shift in the prior week and 0 otherwise, Top(OWNi,q−1) is a
dummy variable equal to one if the ownership characteristic of interest is above the 75th percentile
in the previous quarter, and Totali,q−1 is institutional ownership. We employ previous quarter’s
data such that all variables are known to investors when forecasting returns. Finally, CTRLS
denotes the set of additional controls used, which includes the prior week’s abnormal returns, an
indicator variable that equals one if the stock is part of the S&P 500 index, Amihud’s (2002) ILLIQ
measure, average daily turnover, an indicator variable equal to one if the share price is below $5 in
the previous week, and the number of analysts following the stock to control for visibility. Diether
et al. (2009) show that short selling increases after higher returns in the previous week. Firms with
high concentration may be even more affected by overreaction, and our main result could then be
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due to spurious correlation between lending demand shocks and reversals. Thus, we also include
abnormal returns in the previous week to control for momentum effects.
We present the results in Table 8. In Column (1), we show that outward demand shifts convey
negative information for returns, similar to the results presented by Cohen et al. (2007). The
coefficient on DOUT of -0.199 implies that an outward demand shock decreases abnormal returns
by approximately 0.2% per week (0.8% per month). 18
[Insert Table 8 HERE]
If constraints on lending supply affect prices, then we should observe that the price adjustment
associated with short selling a stock is larger where lending supply is lower. This is expected
because tighter constraints result in delays in incorporating the beliefs of pessimistic investors. In
Column (2) of Table 8, we test this by focusing on ownership concentration. If a more concentrated
ownership structure poses greater limits to arbitrage, then an outward demand shock in firms with
concentrated ownership is expected to have relatively more negative abnormal returns. This is
precisely what we find. The negative and significant coefficient on DOUT ∗ Top(HHI) implies that
an outward demand shock decreases abnormal returns by approximately 0.452% per week (1.92%
per month) in more concentrated firms, similar to the findings presented in Table 7.
In Column (2), we also control for the effects of total ownership and limits to arbitrage. Higher
total ownership relieves supply constraints, as we showed earlier, and Pontiff (2006) argues that
idiosyncratic risk is the largest cost face by arbitrageurs. Stocks in the top quartile of idiosyncratic
risk (Top(Arb. risk)) have an abnormal return following a shorting demand shock of -0.436%
per week. This is consistent with Duan et al. (2010), who show how idiosyncratic risk forecasts
lower abnormal returns only for stocks with high short interest. However, the coefficient on DOUT
∗ Top(HHI) remains negative and significant, which illustrates that the impact of concentrated
18Cohen et al. (2007) find returns of 3.27% per month associated with outward demand shifts. However, once
transaction costs, this value reduces to 0.37% per month.
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ownership following shorting demand shocks is not simply due to high concentration stocks having
high arbitrage risk.
Next, in Column (3), we investigate the role of investment horizon. The coefficients of -0.398
and 0.332 on DOUT ∗ Top(Top 5) and DOUT ∗ Top(Top 5–LT), respectively, show that abnormal
returns are more negative after an outward demand shock for stocks that have a greater Top 5
holding but that this effect diminishes with investment horizon. Hence, combined with the results
for short-sale constraints, investors with short-term objectives restrict lending supply and raise
limits to arbitrage, which in turn results in larger negative returns for outward demand shocks.
Finally, in Columns (5) and (6), we examine %Index and Port. conc.. Similar to the results
presented in Table 7, we find little evidence that greater index ownership or fund-level portfolio
concentration impact stock returns.
3.7 Earnings announcements, stock price reactions, and concentration
An alternative test of the impact of ownership structure composition on returns and price delay is
to examine stock price reactions to earnings announcements. A large academic literature attempts
to explain why stock prices underreact to news, that is, why they continue to increase (decrease)
following good (bad) news (Bernard and Thomas 1990). Mendenhall (2004) argues that the magni-
tude of the drift increases with arbitrage risk, and Pontiff (2006) claims that arbitrage risk “appears
to be the single largest cost faced by arbitrageurs.” If ownership structure generates impediments
to arbitrage through short-sale constraints, we would expect to find lower announcement-day re-
actions and larger post-earnings drift for firms with more concentrated ownership and that these
effects are concentrated in Bad news announcements.
Following Livnat and Mendenhall (2006), we compute standardized unexpected earnings (SUE)
as the actual earnings announcement value minus the median of IBES analyst forecasts made less
than ninety days before the announcement, scaled by share price on the announcement day. We
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only include firms in the extreme quintiles of earnings news, with those in the top quintile of SUE
in a given quarter defined as those with Good earnings news, while those in the bottom quintile are
those with Bad earnings news. We define the indicator variable DSUE , to be equal to 1 if SUE is
in the bottom quintile in a given quarter and 0 if in the top quintile, excluding all others from the
estimation. We also sort stocks into quintiles according to measures of ownership concentration in
the previous quarter. For each measure, we define an indicator variable,D“X”, to be equal to 1 if the
stock is in the top quintile of the distribution of “X” and 0 otherwise. As further controls, we also
include indicators variables for arbitrage risk (DArbitrage risk ) and total institutional ownership
(DTotal), constructed in similar fashion.
Our estimation framework examines how cumulative abnormal return measures vary with the
type of news and ownership concentration measures. We implement a differences-in-differences
framework using three alternative measures of abnormal returns. CAR1 is the announcement-
day reaction, defined as the cumulative abnormal returns during the [t-1,t+1] window around the
Compustat announcement date. CAR2 is defined as the cumulative abnormal returns during the
[t+2,t+10] window and captures the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) up to 10 trading
days after the announcement. CAR3 is defined as cumulative returns over the period from two
days after the announcement (i.e., t+2) through the following quarter’s earnings announcement
and aims to capture the long-term PEAD. Our estimated equation is the following:
CARi,t = β1 + β2D
SUE
i,t +
(
β3 + β4D
SUE
i,t
) ∗DConci,t−1
+
(
θ1 + θ2D
SUE
i,t
) ∗DArbitrage riski,t−1 + (γ1 + γ2DSUEi,t ) ∗DTotali,t−1 + i,t, (2)
The interpretation of these coefficients is straightforward. For each stock i and earnings an-
nouncement event at time t, the intercept β1 captures the mean abnormal return for Good earnings-
announcements conditional on low concentration (i.e.,DConc = 0), which we expect to be positive.
β1+β2 is the abnormal return for Bad news observed for low concentration firms. β3 is the marginal
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difference for high concentration stocks conditional onGood news. And β4 captures the incremen-
tal impact of high concentration for Bad news (DSUE=1). If stock price reactions are delayed due
to high concentration for Bad news only, we expect β4 (but not β3) to be positive for CAR1 (i.e.,
under-reaction) and negative for CAR2 and CAR3 (i.e., delayed reaction).
We report our results in Table 9. In Columns (1) to (4), we analyze announcement-window
returns (CAR1). Estimates for β1 show that the reaction on the [t-1,t+1] announcement window
is positive for Good earnings announcements, and estimates for β1 + β2 shows that the reaction
is negative for Bad news, similar to previous research. Higher institutional ownership is also
associated with a larger reaction following Good news (γ1) and Bad news (γ1 + γ2) in all cases.
Focusing on HHI in Column (2), we find that the reaction to earnings news varies asymmetrically
with ownership concentration. β3 is insignificant, which illustrates that ownership concentration
does not affect announcement returns for Good news. However, the β4 coefficient equals 2.17%
and is significant at the 1% level, which shows that stocks with concentrated ownership tend to
under-react to Bad news, consistent with price delay.
Next, we examine the post-earnings announcement drift. Both CAR2 and CAR3 are even more
negative after Bad news for stocks with high HHI, consistent with price delay following the un-
derreaction documented in Column (1). In Column (6), the value of β4 for CAR2 implies that the
PEAD observed in the [t+2,t+10] period is -2.76% lower when DSUE = 1 for stocks in the top
HHI quintile. In Column (10), we find that this effect equals to -4.70% for CAR3. Overall, we find
that higher ownership concentration stocks tend to have a lower speed of adjustment to news due
to stronger limits to arbitrage, which in turn lead to smaller price reactions on the announcement
day and bigger PEAD.
We find similar results for stocks with higher ownership among the largest five shareholders
(Top 5). The value of the β4 coefficient is 2.430 in Column (3), -2.997 in Column (6), and -8.786
in Column (10), all statistically significant at the 5% level. However, we do not find any effects
related to Top 5–LT. Similar to results in Table 8, we do not find any effects of passive ownership
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or portfolio concentration on abnormal returns, apart from DPort.conc. being significant at the 10%
level in Column (4).
4 Robustness Checks
We present robustness tests in the Internet Appendix. In Table IA.1, we examine the effects of
nonlinearity. Results resemble those in Tables 3 and 4, where we include squared and cubic terms
for each of the ownership measures and for market capitalization. We address the concern that
our results are due to spurious correlation caused by nonstationarity of dependent variables and
explanatory variables in Table IA.2. We repeat our tests using first differences regressions. For
Total, HHI, and Top 5 the effects endure. However, %Index is no longer significant in explaining
Fee and Arbitrage risk, while Port. conc. is no longer significant for Fee when we use first-
differences. In Table IA.3, we present evidence that results are similar if we measure ownership
characteristics of individual mutual funds (i.e., based on the CDA/Spectrum S12 file) rather than
management-companies (i.e., based on the CDA/Spectrum S34 file).
Options may provide an alternative market to arbitrage away mispricing.19 In Table IA.4, we
show that our results on ownership structure are robust to the inclusion of options’ open interest.
In Table IA.5, we also show that our return results are unaffected by option liquidity and stock
liquidity. We re-estimate regressions in Table 8 and show that our main results on returns are un-
affected by the inclusion of the interaction of DOUT with turnover, fee, bid-ask spread, Amihud’s
ILLIQ, breadth, and indicator variables equal to 1 if firms are, respectively, in the top quartile of
fee, bid-ask spread, Amihud’s ILLIQ, change in breadth, and options’ open interest.
Our final robustness test estimates calendar-time regressions instead of panel regressions. In
Table IA.6, we show regressions of weekly portfolio returns as a function of the Fama-French
factors and momentum. In Column (1) of panel A, we form a portfolio that is long stocks where
19Grundy et al. (2012) show that the availability of put options depends on the ability to hedge by shorting the stock.
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DOUT=0 and Top(HHI)=0 and short for those stocks for which DOUT=1 and Top(HHI)=1. The
long-short difference is statistically significant at the 5% level and equal to 0.464% per week, sim-
ilar to our findings using cross-sectional regressions. In Columns (2)–(4), this result is unaffected
by controlling for the market (MKT), size (SMB), book-to-market (HML), and momentum (UMD)
factors. In panels B and C, we examine a portfolio that is long stocks where DOUT=0 and short
for those stocks for which DOUT=1, for Top(HHI)=0 and Top(HHI)=1 stocks, respectively. The
results once again illustrate that the abnormal returns associated with demand shocks arise only for
those stocks with high ownership concentration.
5 Concluding Remarks
Arbitrageurs often use short selling as part of their trading strategy, borrowing securities they do
not own to correct overvaluation. Short selling entails various costs and risks, such as locating
shares to borrow, loan fees, and the risk that the short position is closed because of a recall by the
lender of the borrowed shares. We hypothesize that institutional investors’ lending preferences over
individual stocks will vary with their own investment philosophy and time horizon and therefore
that ownership composition affects limits to arbitrage. We argue and show that their decision to
withhold a stock raises short-sale constraints and limits the ability of arbitrageurs to take short
positions and exploit inefficiencies, which, in turn, results in both higher prices and delays in
incorporating pessimistic investors’ opinions.
The abnormal returns following an outward demand shock tend to be more negative for stocks
with concentrated ownership, consistent with short-sale constraints limiting negative information
from being impounded in prices. We find that stocks in the top quartile of ownership concentration
earn an average abnormal return following an outward demand shock of -0.47% per week, or -2%
per month, relative to a similar demand shock for stocks with dispersed ownership. These results
suggest a link between the limits to arbitrage and ownership structure, which, to the best of our
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knowledge, has not been explored previously. Results on lending supply also hold in tests that
use 13D filings for investor activism and when comparing dual-class shares. The return results are
robust to several alternative explanations, including liquidity, price reversals, time-series portfolio
returns regressions, and changes in investor sentiment among others.
Ownership structure also affects the stock price reaction to earnings announcements. Stocks
with more concentrated ownership exhibit smaller announcement-day reactions and larger post-
earnings announcement drift. Moreover, this result is driven by negative news events, which rein-
forces the impact of ownership structure on short-sale constraints. Combined with the findings on
returns, these results suggest that ownership concentration affects the speed of information flow.
Our contribution is also methodological in nature. We show that institutional ownership is not
a sufficient statistic to proxy for lending supply as is often assumed in the literature (see Asquith
et al. 2005; Lamont 2012; Nagel 2005; Akbas et al. 2008; Kolasinski et al. 2013 among others).
Instead, both institutional ownership levels and the structure of institutional ownership should be
considered.
Our results are important in showing how a firm’s ownership structure can be associated with
limits to arbitrage through the impact on the equity lending market. Furthermore, our approach
can be used by practitioners to better identify the subset of firms that experience abnormal negative
returns following increases in short-selling demand.
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Figure 1: Loan fees and equity lending quantities scaled by market capitalization
For each quarter between August 2006 and December 2010, the figure shows the average lendable supply
as a fraction of market capitalization (Supply), shares on loan as a fraction of firm capitalization (On loan),
and value-weighted annualized loan fee (Fee).
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Figure 2: Equity lending market: Total size and utilization
For each quarter between August 2006 and December 2010, the figure shows the average Utilization, the
aggregate dollar value of lendable supply, and the aggregate dollar value of stocks on loan.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
The table shows the quarterly descriptive statistics between August 2006 and December 2010. Equity lending data
are provided by Markit; price data are from CRSP; ownership data are from the SEC’s 13F holdings (CDA/Spectrum
s34); index fund ownership is constructed from mutual fund holdings data (CDA/Spectrum s12); and accounting data
are from Compustat. Obs. is the number of firm-quarter observations available. Panel A reports the equity lending
characteristics. Panel B reports the institutional ownership and portfolio characteristics. Panel C reports the price data.
The variable definitions are defined in the Appendix.
Variable Obs. Mean Median SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis
A. Equity lending
Supply 59,276 20.02 20.14 12.89 0.00 53.69 0.30 2.40
On loan 59,276 4.69 2.51 5.77 0.00 27.81 186.51 648.90
Fee (bps p.a.) 59,276 70.58 13.36 184.85 -6.83 1301 4.52 25.88
Fee score 59,276 1.37 1.00 1.12 1.00 10.00 3.90 20.12
Specialness 59,276 13.86 0.00 34.55 0.00 100 209.20 537.65
Utilization 59,276 19.25 11.84 20.49 0.00 84.61 1.34 4.10
B. Institutional ownership
Total 59,276 58.34% 63.80% 30.37% 0.00% 100% -0.34 1.86
HHI 59,276 12.11% 6.56% 13.99% 1.27% 100% 2.90 13.35
Top 5 59,276 54.56% 47.72% 22.40% 15.25% 100% 0.63 2.18
Top 5–LT 59,276 37.03% 30.34% 24.81% 0.00% 100% 0.86 2.92
Breadth 59,276 141.10 90.00 179.92 1.00 1,683 3.37 18.66
∆(Breadth) 59,276 0.98% 0.00% 3.06% -4.28% 18.57% 1.42 3.73
% Index 59,276 5.35% 2.92% 6.18% 0.00% 26.21% 1.36 4.41
Port. conc. 59,276 0.34% 0.06% 1.35% -2.37% 9.28% 0.04 0.26
C. Pricing and other variables
Price 59,276 22.79 15.44 40.38 0.04 2432.34 22.83 897.57
Mkt. cap 59,276 3,687 403 16,311 0.31 513,362 12.51 226.94
µ(Ret) 59,276 2.47% 0.57% 34.18% -94.23% 1,833% 8.70 273.59
σ(Ret) 59,276 3.52% 2.84% 2.80% 0.15% 244.79% 14.87 992.37
Arb. risk 59,276 2.99 2.35 2.65 0.15 230.90 15.49 998.00
Turnover 59,276 0.90 0.65 1.03 0.00 33.72 5.73 96.37
Amihud’s ILLIQ 59,276 2.66 0.01 12.80 0.00 112.15 6.91 54.05
B/M 59,276 0.76 0.58 0.70 -0.07 4.43 2.66 12.32
S&P 500 59,276 1.44% 0.00% 11.93% 0.00% 100% 8.14 67.26
Number of analysts 59,276 1.19 1.10 0.98 0.00 3.81 0.20 1.85
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Lending supply quintiles
The table shows quarterly descriptive statistics for U.S. stocks sorted by equity lending supply quintiles between Au-
gust 2006 and December 2010. Equity lending data are provided by Markit; price data are from CRSP; ownership data
are from SEC’s 13F holdings (CDA/Spectrum s34); index fund ownership is constructed from mutual fund holdings
data (CDA/Spectrum s12); and accounting data are from Compustat. Panel A reports the equity lending characteris-
tics: ObsSupply is the number of firm-quarter observations for which lending supply data are available. Panel B reports
the institutional ownership and portfolio characteristics. Panel C reports the price data. The variable definitions are
defined in the Appendix.
A. Equity lending
Quintile ObsSupply Supply On loan Fee Specialness Utilization Fee score
1 11,856 2.83% 0.62% 186.98 0.41 14.45% 2.01
2 11,855 11.32% 2.85% 81.63 0.16 20.37% 1.47
3 11,855 20.04% 4.78% 34.71 0.05 20.01% 1.17
4 11,855 27.28% 5.99% 23.46 0.03 18.88% 1.10
5 11,855 38.65% 9.19% 26.13 0.03 22.53% 1.12
Total 59,276 20.02% 4.69% 70.59 0.14 19.25% 1.38
B. Institutional ownership
Quintile Total HHI Top 5 Top 5–LT % Index Port. conc. Breadth
1 17.5% 30.4% 85.7% 61.9% 1.1% 0.04% 21
2 42.8% 13.3% 63.1% 44.2% 3.7% 0.51% 79
3 65.1% 7.0% 46.2% 30.4% 6.2% 0.56% 202
4 78.4% 5.1% 39.7% 25.0% 7.4% 0.39% 227
5 87.9% 4.7% 38.1% 23.7% 8.5% 0.20% 176
Total 58.3% 12.1% 54.6% 37.0% 5.4% 0.34% 141
C. Pricing and other variables
Quintile Price Mkt. cap (bil.) µ(Ret) σ(Ret) Arb. risk Turnover βmkt
1 10.74 261 6.40% 4.60% 4.46 0.33 0.36
2 18.03 2,535 5.40% 3.70% 3.28 0.59 0.76
3 26.54 7,463 5.40% 3.10% 2.46 0.97 1.00
4 31.14 5,841 3.10% 2.90% 2.23 1.19 1.06
5 27.48 2,334 -8.00% 3.30% 2.53 1.43 1.08
Total 22.79 3,687 2.50% 3.50% 2.99 0.90 0.85
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Table 3: Lending supply and ownership structure
The table displays regressions of equity lending supply as a function of corporate ownership measures, with quarterly
stock data between August 2006 and December 2010 for U.S. firms. All explanatory variables are standardized each
quarter such that they have zero mean and unit standard deviation. All regressions include year-quarter dummies,
and standard errors are double-clustered at the stock and quarterly level. The variable definitions are defined in the
Appendix. We report standard errors in brackets, and the significance levels are indicated as follows: ** and ***
indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Lending supply
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total 0.447*** 0.441*** 0.411*** 0.443*** 0.460***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027]
HHI -0.043***
[0.009]
Top 5 -0.159***
[0.017]
Top 5–LT 0.029***
[0.007]
% Index 0.026***
[0.004]
Port. conc. -0.091***
[0.006]
∆(Breadth) -0.008 -0.007 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
Mkt. cap 0.388*** 0.373*** 0.316*** 0.382*** 0.418***
[0.051] [0.051] [0.052] [0.051] [0.051]
DP<5 -0.049** -0.047* -0.045* -0.049** -0.048**
[0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.024] [0.024]
Amihud’s ILLIQ -0.002 -0.001 -0.004* -0.002 -0.002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Turnover 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.026***
[0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
B/M 0.191*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.189*** 0.184***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015]
DS&P500 0.017 0.023 0.075 0.017 0.042
[0.445] [0.445] [0.440] [0.450] [0.442]
Number of analysts 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.014***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
Momentum -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Obs. 59,055 59,055 59,055 59,055 59,055
Firms 4,266 4,266 4,266 4,266 4,266
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Table 5: Propensity score-matched sample results
The table shows the impact of ownership structure on lending supply, loan fee, and arbitrage risk on a propensity-score
matched sample of U.S. stocks between August 2006 and December 2010. The propensity scores are computed from
a 1:1 matching without replacement based on the covariates and interactions, with a 0.01 caliper. Panel A presents
results for HHI; panel B presents results for Top 5 and Top 5–LT; panel C presents results for %Index; and panel
D presents results for Port. conc. respectively. The treatment variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firms are
in the top quartile in a given quarter in all panels, with the exception of panel C, where we use the bottom quartile.
In panel A, of the 14,819 treatment observations we can find matches for 5,280 observations, with the total sample
comprising 10,560 observations (5,280 treatment and 5,280 matched control stocks). Similarly, in panel B, we find
matches for 6,006 observations, in panel C we find matches for 11,899 observations, and in panel D we find matches
for 11,942 observations. All variables are standardized each quarter such that they have zero mean and unit standard
deviation. All regressions follow the same specifications as in Tables 3 and 4 and include stock characteristics, stock
fixed effects, and year-quarter dummies. The variable definitions are defined in the Appendix. We report standard
errors in brackets, and the significance levels are indicated as follows: ** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and
1% level, respectively.
A. HHI B. Top 5 & Top 5–LT
Supply Fee Arb. risk Supply Fee Arb. risk
Total 0.325*** -0.092 -0.122*** Total 0.315*** -0.144** -0.032
[0.029] [0.062] [0.038] [0.026] [0.059] [0.043]
HHI -0.074*** 0.099*** 0.043* Top 5 -0.140*** 0.155*** 0.059*
[0.014] [0.036] [0.027] [0.017] [0.050] [0.035]
Obs. 10,560 10,560 10,560 Top 5–LT 0.012** -0.043** 0.005
[0.006] [0.020] [0.016]
Obs. 12,012 12,012 12,012
C. % Index D. Port. conc.
Supply Fee Arb. risk Supply Fee Arb. risk
Total 0.416*** -0.093** -0.104*** Total 0.447*** -0.031 -0.111***
[0.020] [0.039] [0.030] [0.022] [0.036] [0.021]
% Index 0.010* -0.004 -0.014** Port. conc. -0.080*** 0.009 0.008
[0.005] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.006]
Obs. 23,798 23,798 23,798 Obs. 23,884 23,884 23,884
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Table 6: Evidence from SEC 13D filings
The table shows the impact of an activism-led ownership structure on lending supply, loan fee, and arbitrage risk using
SEC 13D filings. For the 223 stocks associated with a SEC 13D filing, we examine ownership composition in the
four quarters prior to filing and post-filing. In panel A, we present univariate tests of the differences in ownership
characteristics, lendable supply, fee, and arbitrage risk (Arb. risk ) around the filing. There are 723 observations in
the pre-period and 783 observations in the post-period (1,506 stock-quarters in total). Block ownership is the fraction
of institutional ownership held by investors with stakes greater than 5%. In panel B, we present evidence from the
regression specification:
Yit = θi + θt + γPostit +X
′β + εit
where Yit is one of the following: lending supply (Supply), loan fee (Fee), and arbitrage risk (Arb. risk),; Post is an
indicator variable equal to one in the post-13D filing period for stock i; and X is the set of control variables employed in
Table 3, including ∆(Breadth), Ln(Mkt. cap),DP<5, Amihud’s ILLIQ, Turnover,B/M , No. of analysts,DS&P500,
and Momentum. All regressions include stock fixed effects, and year-quarter dummies. Standard errors are clustered
at the stock level. The variable definitions are defined in the Appendix. We report standard errors in brackets, and the
significance levels are indicated as follows: ** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
A. Univariate evidence
Pre Post Diff.
Block ownership 0.221 0.241 0.020***
Total ownership 0.626 0.603 -0.023
HHI 0.105 0.118 0.013**
% index 0.052 0.052 0.000
Supply (%) 21.65 19.63 -2.02***
Fee (bps) 56.48 73.52 17.04**
Arb. risk 3.26 3.64 0.38**
B. Difference-in-differences evidence
Supply Fee Arbitrage Risk
Post -0.165*** 0.086** 0.124*
[0.032] [0.042] [0.073]
Obs. 1,506 1,506 1,506
Firms 223 223 223
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Table 7: Stock concentration measures and abnormal returns after shorting demand shocks
The table shows the averages of weekly abnormal returns of portfolios sorted on outward demand shocks (DOUT) in
the previous week and alternative measures of concentration in the previous quarter using U.S. stock data from August
2006 to December 2010. Abnormal returns are defined as the difference in weekly returns relative to a matched
benchmark portfolio sorted by market capitalization, book-to-market, and momentum as in Daniel et al. 1997. DOUT
captures outward equity lending demand shocks, and is equal to 1 if in the previous week there is an increase in the
fee score and an increase in loaned amount and 0 otherwise. Within each value of DOUT in the previous week, we
sort stocks into quartiles using alternative concentration measures and define an indicator variable equal to 1 if the
stock is in the top quartile and 0 otherwise. Panel A (HHI) is based on the Hirschman-Herfindahl index of institutional
ownership examines. Panel B (Residual HHI) uses the residuals of a regression of HHI on total institutional ownership.
Panel C (Residual % Index) uses the residuals of a regression of (%Index) on total institutional ownership. Panel D
(Residual Port. conc.) uses the residuals of a regression of (Port. conc.) on total institutional ownership. The variable
definitions are defined in the Appendix. We report standard errors in brackets, and the significance levels are indicated
as follows: ** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
A. HHI
Top HHI
DOUT 0 1 1–0
0 0.003 0.004 0.001
1 -0.002 -0.471 -0.469***
1–0 -0.005 -0.475*** -0.470***
B. Residual HHI
Top residual HHI
DOUT 0 1 1–0
0 0.010 0.049 0.039
1 0.008 -0.435 -0.443**
1–0 -0.002 -0.484*** -0.482***
C. Residual % index
Top residual % index
DOUT 0 1 1–0
0 0.015 0.017 0.002
1 -0.126 -0.044 0.082
1–0 -0.141 -0.061 0.080
D. Residual Port. conc.
Top residual port. conc.
DOUT 0 1 1–0
0 0.021 -0.052 -0.073***
1 -0.139 -0.053 0.086
1–0 -0.160*** -0.001 0.159
41
Table 8: Impact of ownership structure stock returns following shorting demand shocks
The table displays the regressions of abnormal returns as a function of equity lending market shocks and lagged own-
ership characteristics using weekly U.S. stock data between August 2006 and December 2010. Abnormal returns are
based on a characteristics-matched benchmark portfolio sorted by market capitalization, book-to-market, and momen-
tum as in Daniel et al. (1997). DOUT captures outward equity lending demand shocks, and is equal to 1 if in the
previous week there is an increase in the fee score and an increase in loaned amount and 0 otherwise. DIN equals 1
if there is a decrease in both fee scores and loaned amount. For each variable X, we construct an indicator variable,
Top(X) (Bottom(X)), equal to 1 if the stock is in the top (bottom) quartile and 0 otherwise. Total is ownership by in-
stitutional holders, and Arbitrage risk is the mean squared error of residuals from Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model.
Stock concentration variables are defined in the appendix. All regressions include calendar-month dummies, prior
week’s abnormal returns, S&P 500 membership indicator, and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the share price is below
$5 in the previous week, the log of previous quarter’s analyst coverage, Amihud’s ILLIQ, and average daily turnover.
The variable definitions are defined in the Appendix. We report standard errors in brackets, and the significance levels
are indicated as follows: ** and *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DOUT -0.199** -0.097 -0.025 -0.114 -0.097 -0.102
[0.091] [0.104] [0.102] [0.107] [0.103] [0.114]
DIN -0.084 -0.092 -0.082 -0.080 -0.077 -0.076
[0.079] [0.076] [0.075] [0.075] [0.075] [0.075]
Bottom(Total) -0.031 -0.025 -0.020 0.014 0.016
[0.053] [0.053] [0.052] [0.047] [0.050]
DOUT*Bottom(Total) 0.105 0.144 0.103 -0.057 -0.018
[0.198] [0.200] [0.200] [0.198] [0.202]
Top(Arb. risk) -0.101 -0.098 -0.087 -0.090
[0.062] [0.062] [0.061] [0.060]
DOUT*Top(Arb. risk) -0.436* -0.418* -0.496** -0.494**
[0.245] [0.250] [0.241] [0.241]
Top(HHI) 0.096*** 0.107***
[0.037] [0.039]
DOUT*Top(HHI) -0.516** -0.452**
[0.226] [0.229]
Top(Top 5) 0.090**
[0.040]
DOUT*Top(Top 5) -0.398*
[0.240]
Top(Top 5–LT) 0.035
[0.028]
DOUT*Top(Top 5–LT) 0.332*
[0.194]
Top(% index) 0.020
[0.036]
DOUT*Top(% index) 0.104
[0.181]
Top(Port. conc.) -0.019
[0.030]
DOUT*Top(Port. conc.) 0.083
[0.156]
Obs. 670,532 670,532 670,532 670,532 670,532 670,532
Firms 4,581 4,581 4,581 4,581 4,581 4,581
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